Abstract -Power system utilities continue to strive for increased system resiliency. However, quantifying a baseline system resilience, and deciding the optimal investments to improve their resilience is challenging. This paper discusses a method to create scenarios, based on historical data, that represent the threats of severe weather events, their probability of occurrence, and the system wide consequences they generate. This paper also presents a mixed-integer stochastic nonlinear optimization model which uses the scenarios as an input to determine the optimal investments to reduce the system impacts from those scenarios. The optimization model utilizes a DC power flow to determine the loss of load during an event. Loss of load is the consequence that is minimized in this optimization model as the objective function. The results shown in this paper are from the IEEE RTS-96 three area reliability model. The scenario generation and optimization model have also been utilized on full utility models, but those results cannot be published.
INTRODUCTION
The resilience of electric power systems is vital for the economy, security, and public safety and health [1] . Quantifying a baseline for power system resilience and improving the resilience of power systems is a significant challenge. This paper considers resilience as the ability to withstand and recover from specific high impact, low probability events. The focus of this paper is to describe an optimization model that helps decision makers deploy infrastructure investments to mitigate the consequences from extreme weather events, despite the complex nature of large power systems. We assess the consequence of extreme events, but we do not directly model recovery or restoration. While resilience combines both the consequence and time to recovery, we focus only on the former throughout this research. The optimization framework is challenging due to the thousands of buses and transmission lines, and the non-linear nature of the physics governing these systems. In addition, investment decisions add binary variables to the optimization model. Lastly, there is a significant amount of uncertainty both in the types of catastrophic events that can impact the system and in whether a specific investment will prevent an outage from occurring.
The increase in natural disasters has illustrated the significant need to improve power system resilience [2] , and research in power system resilience has increased over the past decade and started to cover a broader range of topics. Papers have discussed power system resilience metrics and quantification [3] [4] [5] . In addition, papers discuss the use of distributed generation [6] , microgrids [7, 8] , transmission line switching [9] , selfhealing networks [10] , operational changes [11] , and line hardening [6] , to improve resilience. Research also shows investment decisions to improve reliability [12] [13] [14] . In addition, papers develop models to evaluate power system resilience to extreme weather events [3, 4, 15] . Finally, papers most relevant to this work have developed mixed-integer programs to determine the loss of load during physical attack, and an interdiction method of the worst power system components that an attacker could take out while constrained by an attacker's budget [16, 17] . This paper uses a similar mixed-integer program (MIP) as [16, 17] , but applies it to natural disaster scenarios that are developed using historical data, and then extends the MIP to include an optimization model to determine the best investments to improve the power system resilience.
The goal of this paper is to present an optimization formulation which can improve power system resilience to large natural disasters by choosing the optimal investments (i.e., hardening options) which minimize consequences for a system, given the uncertainty of future adverse weather events. The objective function considered in this project is to minimize the consequences to the system in terms of MWs weighted by importance. Weighting allows the optimization to recognize that the importance of some loads (e.g. emergency services) are greater than others (e.g. lighting). Results are presented on the IEEE RTS-96 reliability test system [18] . This optimization formulation was also used to gather investment results on a U.S. full utility transmission system for extreme winter storms, but results are not public. Results show that if the correct hardening options are selected, there can be a significant reduction in the expected loss of load during disasters, thus improving power system resilience. The overarching goal is depicted in Fig. 1 : determine the best investments which decrease the mean of the consequence during weather events, and most importantly decrease the tail, i.e. the consequence during the worst-case weather events.
The rest of this paper is as follows: Section II describes the scenario development, Section III explains the nonlinear optimization model, Section IV shows results on an IEEE test system, and Section V concludes and provides a discussion of directions for future work. 
II. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
For an accurate solution to the optimization formulation, realistic weather event scenarios must be developed, preferably based on historical data. There is quantifiable, yet significant uncertainty in how often a large weather event will affect a power system, and even more critically, which components on the power system will be affected (component outages) if a weather event occurs. The scenarios must consider the expected hazard of the weather event and the vulnerabilities in the system. Each scenario determines which components in the power system fail, and represents these failures by transmission circuit outages, e.g. if a transformer fails, the circuits on both sides of that transformer are modeled as being out of service.
We can build realistic scenarios of what expected future weather-induced outages may look like using historical data collected from the system of interest. For instance, with a long enough timeline of historical transmission outage data and associated weather causes, we can determine the probability of a specific circuit failing under different weather conditions. This can be done conditionally on the type of weather event in question, or across all weather-related hazards. The historical data to complete this probability assessment needs to be accurate and have a large enough sample size to represent the expected regional hazards and system responses. The level of detail in the available data also determines the types of scenarios that can then be modeled accurately and with confidence. Weatherrelated failures are not random and cannot be treated as such. Some regions of a utility's service area are likely more prone to certain types of weather hazards than others, and some lines are more prone to failing in the face of a hazard than others, perhaps due to age, location, or routing. It is expected that most of the circuits in a system see very few outages, but, in some cases, certain lines that are particularly vulnerable to hazards will see disproportionate numbers of outages in the same time period. It is therefore important to use calculated probabilities for simulated failures, as they can vary among circuits.
With the calculated failure probabilities, we can then sample to obtain a large number of failure scenarios to serve as input to a stochastic optimization problem. Due to the high reliability of the power system generally, failure probabilities of individual lines are very low, on average. Therefore, we can generate scenarios in two different ways, to simulate both 'standard' adverse weather events, which may cause one or two line failures, and 'extreme' events, which can be thought of as representing a category 5 hurricane, for example, resulting in perhaps dozens of circuit outages within a system. Two different solutions will result: optimal investments which mitigate 'standard' weather events, and optimal investments which mitigate 'extreme' weather events. For the first set of 'standard' scenarios, we sample the probability of failure for each circuit, using the associated probabilities derived from historical data. This method results in scenarios with very few circuit failures. These are representative of the majority of adverse-weather consequences, but they do not capture the tail of the distribution seen in Fig. 1 , made up of extreme events with large numbers of outages.
To create the 'extreme' scenarios (which can be weighted differently than 'standard' scenarios), we first randomly sample the probability of failure for a number of outages between 1 and a predetermined maximum, suggested to be chosen to be slightly higher than the maximum observed in the historical data (the distribution being sampled is based on the historical data, with possible modifications based on utility input and engineering judgment). Based on that number of total outages, we then sample circuit outages using their associated probabilities to determine the exact circuits that fail until the number of outages is met.
In most cases, and especially for large systems, the historical database will not have outage data for every transmission component in a system, since it is unlikely that every component will have failed at least once during the period of record. Rather than give these components a zero probability of failure, a method is developed to give these components a lower probability of failure compared to similar components that have failed in the past. For the components without historical data, we can assign a failure probability equal to half of the average failure probability across all components in the same voltage class. This is basically the average of a zero probability of failure and the nominal probability of failure for similar components, and this should be lower than one over the number of historical weather events in the database that have affected that component type. In real systems, there is likely to be some variation in the average outage probability across voltage class, and although geography, age, component vendor, and other indicators will likely have an impact on the probability of failure, voltage class has the most data readily available. This allows us to represent failures throughout the entire system in the scenarios instead of ignoring them. Our assumptions may be limited in their applicability, as there could be good reasons that certain circuits have not experienced outages previously. An underground line, for example, will rarely be impacted by severe weather. A new line, built with higher standards of structural integrity, may have a similarly low probability of failure. In these special cases, and others, engineering judgment can be used to modify the probabilities if need be.
Further information on modeling the probability of failure during weather events can be found in [15, 19] .
III. NONLINEAR OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION
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Note that this model is not easily scalable, and real power systems are large with thousands of buses and lines. The size of the power system strongly correlates to the difficulty and time required to solve this model. That is, for full power systems with tens of thousands of buses and transmission lines, a super computer may be needed to reach a valid solution.
IV. RESULTS FROM AN EXAMPLE CASE
The example used for this paper is the IEEE RTS-96 reliability test system with three areas, 73 buses, 120 transmission lines, and 99 generators [18] . Typically, historical data is utilized to create weather event scenarios, including geographical considerations, but for the example case, scenarios were drawn randomly based on known outage rates for voltage levels during extreme winter storms, and number of components disabled during extreme winter storms. For a real system, the scenarios of potential future weather events should be based on past experience, but here we demonstrate the methodology using synthetic data. The number of components lost during winter storms is based off the synthetic probability density functions in Table I , II, and III. There are only two voltage levels in the RTS-96 system: 138 and 230 kV. It is assumed the 138 kV has twice the likelihood of failing compared to the 230 kV buses and lines. Note that transformers are modeled as transmission lines in the RTS-96 system, and transformers will have one tenth the probability of failure compared to 138 kV lines; this is in Table IV. Weather scenarios can have different weight levels to emphasize higher probability scenarios. For this example system, all scenarios were assumed to have the same occurrence probability. Component outage possibilities are: buses, transmission lines (or transformers), and generators. Each scenario includes outages of these components. In the model, if a bus outage occurs, all transmission lines connected to that bus are placed offline. Between 0-4 buses, 0-4 generators, and 3-15 lines could be removed in each scenario. These scenarios represent the possible consequences from a major winter storm.
Based on Tables I -IV, fifty scenarios are created to represent a future severe winter storm. Too few scenarios will not represent the uncertainty of the winter storms properly; too many scenarios will slow the optimization program to a point where it will not reach a valid solution. The only limiting factor to the number of scenarios is the computation time. The more scenarios the harder the problem is to solve in a reasonable amount of time. For a small test case, this is not a severe problem, but with a full utility transmission system, the problem is much more complex and difficult to scale with thousands of scenarios.
These scenarios are the input to the MIP in Section III. The goal is to determine the ideal investments to minimize the loss of load during the given scenarios. Investment costs are considered based on generic monetary cost units, rather than on a specific dollar amount. This part of the model (the cost of investments) could include much more detail, but would need significant input from the utility to determine actual prices to protect each component. For this example, to protect a transmission line from the winter storm costs 10 units, protection for a generator costs 50 units, and protection for a bus costs 100 units. Fig. 2 depicts the expected loss of load given the set of scenarios based on an investment budget. The base case is the zero-budget case, it is the system as is, and shows the worst expected load shed. As the budget increases, lines, generators, or buses are protected from the winter storm, and the expected loss of load decreases as in Fig. 2 . For each budget, the solution also identifies the specific components that need the investment. Fig. 2 and the list of components that need upgrades allows the utility to determine what investment amount is best for the utility, and if that investment is worth the improvement in resilience. Fig. 3 shows the expected load loss for each of the fifty scenarios with no investments vs. a budget of 1000 units. The 50 scenarios are organized from least severe to most severe in terms of load lost. There is a significant improvement in the loss of load, especially at the tail of the curve i.e. greatest improvement in resilience is seen during the worst scenarios (scenario numbers 45 -50 in. Fig. 3 ). This is important, as the most extreme events end up accounting for a disproportionate amount of restoration and recovery costs. Investments that will help most with the tail of the curve in Fig. 1 will greatly improve resilience to the most extreme events, which is the primary goal of this model. Fig. 3 also demonstrates the overall improvement from baseline resilience to the upgraded resilience of the system, similar to Fig. 1 . Although winter storm scenarios are considered in this example, it is just as easy to come up with a set of scenarios that represent hurricanes, earthquakes, fires, tornados, etc. In addition, scenarios can be generated for all events. Which weather scenarios to come up with, will likely depend on the area of the world and the weather events in that area. For example, a utility in California could create scenarios for earthquakes, fires, and tsunamis based on historical data; a utility in Florida may create scenarios for hurricanes based on historical data. Looking ahead, the scenarios themselves should also account for projections into the future, as weather patterns may change significantly in certain regions of the country as a result of climate change. There are multiple layers of uncertainty that should be accounted for in planning for future investments to harden a system against adverse weather. The more accurate the scenarios, the better the results of the investment optimization. In addition, accurate results would depend on actual costs to protect components from the scenarios in question.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a model to determine the optimal hardening investments which minimize the loss of load on a power system from extreme weather events. The goal of this model is to help utilities decide on investments to improve the resilience of their system. This paper discusses a method to create scenarios based on historical data to represent extreme weather events. Then results are shown on the IEEE RTS-96 three area model. Results indicate that optimal investments can significantly improve resilience of a power system, especially the worst scenarios, i.e. the very low probability, but extremely high consequence events.
Future work will be focused on improving the scaling of the problem, both on large real-world systems with thousands of buses and transmission lines and in using hundreds of scenarios to represent the severe weather, which will likely require a super computer to solve. In addition, work will focus on merging this method with a reliability optimization method; even if this method improves resilience of a power system, utilities want to know how it will affect their reliability. This will help formulate a better rate-recovery case for utilities if they can show how an investment improves both their reliability and resiliency. In addition, future work will try a robust optimization approach rather than a stochastic optimization approach which may represent the uncertainty in the model better.
